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PERSONAL TORTS
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Edmund Rugger Burke III**
Dustin B. Benham***

INTRODUCTION
"It is the function of justice not to do wrong to one's fellow-men".
-Cicero, De Officiis 1, 97, (Miller Translation,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1913).
ORT law is a body of law that creates and provides remedies for
civil wrongs that do not arise out of contractual duties or statutes.1
It is also one of the most practical areas of law-dealing with auto
accidents, medical malpractice, and defective baby seats-often touching
those who ordinarily have little contact with the legal system. But as esoteric or banal as a survey of tort law may first seem, it is important for
three reasons: (1) tort cases directly affect not only the rights of individual parties, but the rights and responsibilities of all individuals and businesses who face similar issues every day; (2) tort cases often resolve
fundamental debates within jurisprudence and legal theory having broad
reaching affects on other areas of law (for example, the admissibility of
expert testimony established in tort cases applies to experts serving in
contract cases); and (3) tort cases often reflect the current moral and political philosophy prevailing in our system of jurisprudence.
Over the past year, a distinct pattern has emerged in the disposition of
personal injury case by the Texas Supreme Court. In almost every personal injury case decided during the Survey period, the supreme court has
decided in favor of the defendants. With very few exceptions, the cases
surveyed resulted in a win for the defendant corporation, insurer, or busi* B.B.A., Accounting, University of Texas at Arlington; J.D., cum laude, Baylor Law
School; C.P.A. Price Johnson is the founding partner of The Johnson Firm in Dallas and

Nacogdoches, Texas and an adjunct professor of law at Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law.
** B.S., Mathematics, Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Edmund Rugger Burke, III is the managing partner of The Burke Firm, P.C. in

Dallas.
*** B.A., summa cum laude, Texas Tech University; J.D., cum laude, Baylor Law

School. Dustin B. Benham is an associate at The Brown Law Firm in Dallas and an adjunct professor of law at Baylor Law School.
Work on this paper was contributed by Kirk L. Pittard and Emily Coleman McCall, but
the opinions expressed are the responsibility of its primary authors.
1. "Tort" is the Norman word for a "wrong." As traditionally used, this kind of wrong
is distinct from a contractual or criminal wrong. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, p. xxiii (Oxford Press 2003) (1980).
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ness and a corresponding loss for the individual plaintiff. The long-term
effect of these decisions will be far reaching. The supreme court decided
important tort cases in the hot-button areas of workers' compensation,
personal jurisdiction, subrogation, vicarious liability, and causation. In
addition, the Texas courts of appeals made their first foray into the "paid
or incurred" debate. These opinions looked at the issue of whether plaintiff may only recover medical expenses she actually paid or whether she
may also recover for expenses "incurred" when visiting a treating doctor
or hospital. For now, the answer to that question and the future of the
collateral source rule 2 remain unclear. But the decisions provide insight
and reasoning that may be persuasive in the future. In light of the changing judicial environment in Texas, both plaintiff and defense counsel
should pay special attention to decisions that alter well-settled law or establish new principles.
I.

WORKERS COMPENSATION

The holding in Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 3 while significant,
is far less likely to have a practical impact on an injured employee's right
to sue third parties than many commentators suggest. The case broadens,
slightly, the definition of a "general contractor" under the Texas Labor
Code as it applies to the protections given to employers that provide
workers compensation coverage. The protection, known as the "exclusive remedy defense" states that an injured employee's remedy is limited
to the coverage provided under the applicable policy of workers' compensation insurance, barring any suit against an employer providing such coverage. Conversely, an injured employee may sue a non-subscriber
employer or a third party that is not covered by the statutory protections.
In Entergy, the Texas Supreme Court agreed to extend employer protections provided to a "premises owner," in the limited circumstances where
a premises owner meets the requirements of a general contractor under
the Labor Code. The supreme court stated that "the governing Labor
Code definitions of general contractor and subcontractor do not forbid a
'4
premises owner from also being a general contractor."
The case itself is very fact intensive. Entergy Gulf States hired International Maintenance Corp. (IMC) to perform construction and maintenance on its Sabine Station plant in Texas. 5 The construction contract
referred to IMC as both a 'contractor' and as an 'independent contrac2. The purpose of the collateral source rule is based on longstanding and sound public policy recognizing that a tortfeasor should not have the benefit of insurance proceeds
procured by the injured party and to which the wrongdoer was not privy. Brown v. Am.
Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1980); see also Texarkana Mem'l Hosp.
Inc. v. Murdock, 903 S.W.2d 868, 874 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995) ("The tortfeasor, however, has no right to get the benefit of a bargain made by [the benefit provider]."), rev'd on
other grounds, 946 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1997).
3. No. 05-0272, 2007 WL 2458027 (Tex. 2007).
4. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
5. Id. *1 n.1.
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tor.' It assigns no special reference to Entergy other than to refer to Entergy and its affiliates as "Entergy Companies." Based on these few facts
alone, this appears to be a typical business arrangement whereby a premise owner (Entergy) retains a general contractor (IMC) to perform services. This, however, is where the typical nature of the fact pattern stops.
The portion of the contract defining IMC as an independent contractor
specifies that this language should not be construed to bar Entergy from
raising the 'statutory employee' defense. Entergy and IMC later
amended the contract to "recognize Entergy as the statutory employer of
the IMC employees (while IMC would remain the 'direct employer') in
order to take advantage of a Louisiana law that shields statutory employers from tort liability." The amended contract also provided that in exchange for a reduced contract price, Entergy would obtain and pay for a
policy to provide workers' compensation coverage to IMC's Sabine plant
employees. Summers was injured while working for IMC at the Sabine
plant. "He applied for and received benefits under the policy, then sued
'6
Entergy for negligence."
The Texas Supreme Court looked at the definition of a "general contractor" under the provisions of the Texas Labor Code that make
worker's compensation benefits an employee's exclusive remedy against
an employer for covered work-related injures. 7 The supreme court concluded that "the governing Labor Code definitions of general contractor
and subcontractor do not forbid a premises owner from also being a general contractor."8 The supreme court held "that a premises owner that
undertakes to procure work falls within the statute's definition of a general contractor." 9 The supreme court also noted that a "general contractor 'may enter into a written agreement [with a subcontractor] under
which the general contractor provides workers' compensation coverage
to the subcontractor and the subcontractor's employees, and such an
agreement 'makes the general contractor the employer of the subcontractor and the subcontractor's employees for purposes of the workers' compensation laws." 10 Further, the supreme court limited its analysis to
whether a premises owner could also be a general contractor.
Given the narrow scope in this case, 1 and a finding that Summers
6. Id.
7. Id. at *2 (citing TEX.

LABOR

CODE ANN. §§ 408.001(a) (Vernon 2006)).

8. Id. at *3.
9. Id. at *1.
10. Id. (citing TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 406.123(a), (e) (Vernon 2006)).
11. Summers entire suit was premised on the argument that Entergy did not qualify
for the protections of the exclusive-remedy defense under the Texas Labor Code. Therefore, it was unnecessary for Summers to have raised each specific requisite element of the
statute at trial, when in fact Summers raised the defense in its entirety as the very premise
of its suit. Nonetheless, the supreme court began its opinion by summarily dismissing, and
thus not addressing, this requirement. Had it been properly raised, it may well have prevented the statutory employer defense from extending to Entergy, even in this unique
situation.

SMU LAW REVIEW

1016

[Vol. 61

waived one of its arguments,1 2 the Texas Supreme Court found that Entergy met the qualifications of a general contractor as defined by the Labor Code and thus, was entitled to the Labor Code's exclusive-remedy
defense.
"PAID OR INCURRED" AND SUBROGATION
13
The holding in Daughters of Charity Health Services v. Linnstaedter
resolved the apparent conflict between the Texas Property Code, which
grants hospitals the right to file liens against an accident victim's causes of
action, and the Texas Labor Code's cap on workers' compensation medical payments. Specifically, "whether a hospital paid by a workers' compensation carrier can recover the discount from its full charges by filing a
lien against a patient's tort recovery.' 4 The supreme court's decision,
while significant, is also regularly cited incorrectly as controlling on the
issue of "paid and incurred" expenses; an issue incorrectly referenced in a
footnote.
The facts of the case are as follows: coworkers Donald Linnstaedter
and Kenneth Bolen were riding together in a car during the course of
their employment when they were involved in a motor vehicle accident.5
The coworkers were transported to and treated at the same hospital.'
The hospital charges totaled $22,704.25, of which the workers' compensation carrier paid $9,737.54. In accordance with the Texas Property Code,
the hospital filed a lien for the balance of the charges with the county
clerk. The lien attached to the employees' claims against the at-fault
driver. 16 Linnstaedter and Bolen settled their claims for $175,000, of
17
which the third-party carrier paid $12,966.71 to pay off the hospital lien.
Linnstaedter and Bolen brought suit against the hospital to recover the
$12,966.71 claiming that the hospital's lien was invalid under the workers'
compensation caps of the Labor Code.1 8 The hospital countered that it
had a valid claim under the lien provisions of the Texas Property Code.
"To secure costs a health[care] provider may incur treating accident
victims, the Texas Property Code grants hospitals a lien on any cause of
action a patient may have against a tortfeasor." 19 "To ensure full coverage for employees protected by workers' compensation, [however,] the
Texas Labor Code provides that hospitals 'may not pursue a private claim
against a workers' compensation claimant' for all or part of the costs of
treatment. ' 20 The supreme court reasoned that the lien only exists as a
II.

12. The supreme court concluded that Summers did not timely raise the argument
related to one of the requisite elements of being a general contractor, and therefore it was
waived.
13. 226 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. 2007).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 411 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 55.002(a) (Vernon 2007)).
20. Id. (citing TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 413.042(a) (Vernon 2007)).
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result of the underlying claim and that "the only support for a hospital
lien is its claim for reimbursement from the patient.12 1
The supreme court determined that "while the Property Code grants
hospitals a lien to secure their fees, the Labor Code prohibits liens against
compensation patients. ' 22 "A hospital that treats workers' compensation
patients is bound by the Labor Code's provisions. '23 "Included among
those provisions are caps on reimbursement, and a bar against asking patients or their compensation carriers for more. '24 The supreme court
held that "because hospitals cannot sue such patients for the discount,
they cannot accomplish indirectly (by filing a lien) what they could not do
25
directly (by filing suit).
In discussing the hospital's argument, the supreme court noted that the
"hospital's most salient point is that in the suit against Jones, Linnstaedter and Bolen sought the full medical charges billed by the hospital
rather than the reduced amount paid by their compensation carrier. '26
The supreme court agreed that "a recovery of medical expenses in that
amount would be a windfall; as the hospital had no claim for these
amounts against the patients, [Linnstaedter and Bolen] in turn had no
claim for them against Jones."' 27 The supreme court, in footnote 22, cited
Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Forth,28 for the proposition that "an insured who
had no exposure for unreimbursed medical expenses had no standing to
assert a claim against her insurer for underpayment"2 9 and stated that
"[t]his rule has since been codified" in section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.3 0 However, section 41.0105 is the paid-orincurred statute enacted as part of HB 4 in 2003, years after the filing of
Linnstaedter. As a result, section 41.0105 was not briefed nor argued
before the Texas Supreme Court.
Because the applicability of section 41.0105 was not properly before
the supreme court, its comments concerning section 41.0105 in footnote
22 are merely obiter dictum.3 1 As such, the supreme court's comments
constitute neither binding nor persuasive authority.3 2 Therefore, the su21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 410.
26. Id. at 412.

27. Id.

28. 204 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tex. 2006).
29. Daughters of Charity Health Scv., 226 S.W.3d at 412 n.22.

30. Id.

31. Obiter dictum is distinguishable from judicial dictum. Obiter dictum "is an obser-

vation or remark made concerning some rule, principle, or application of law suggested in
a particular case, which observation or remark is not necessary to the determination of the
case." Edwards v. Kaye, 9 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet.
denied). "Judicial dictum, a statement made by the supreme court made very deliberately
after mature consideration and for future guidance in the conduct of litigation, is 'at least
persuasive and should be followed unless found to be erroneous."' Id.
32. Nichols v. Catalano, 216 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.);
Edwards, 9 S.W.3d at 314.
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preme court's comments on the issue33 of the paid-or-incurred doctrine
should not prejudice future litigation.
Although Mills v. Fletcher34 was the first opinion to address the Texas
paid-or-incurred statute, codified in section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, it provides little precedence. The case is a
mere plurality opinion and, therefore has no binding precedential value.
Even within the San Antonio appellate district it is merely dicta.35 Because the opinion is merely dicta, it is of no greater precedence than a
dissenting opinion and, to the extent either can be considered persuasive
36
authority, it has no more persuasive authority than a dissenting opinion.
Therefore, it is important not only to analyze the persuasive value of the
plurality opinion, but also that of the dissenting opinion. Regardless, the
case is noteworthy on the basis that it is the first case to consider the paidor-incurred doctrine.
Fletcher sued Mills for personal injuries. The jury found for Fletcher
and awarded him $1,551.00 in past medical expenses. Mills appealed arguing that Fletcher's medical expenses should have been reduced pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.0105 because
his medical providers accepted reduced amounts for their services from
his health insurance company. 37 Justice Karen Angelini held that "section 41.0105 limits a plaintiff from recovering medical or health care expenses that have been adjusted or 'written off.' '38 Justice Steven C.
Hilbig concurred in judgment only. Justice Catherine Stone dissented.
The plurality opinion ignores well-settled law and clear legislative history in reaching several of the conclusions upon which the holding is
based. First, the supreme court ignores that "incurred" is well defined in
Texas case law in an effort to develop its own result-oriented definition.
Although the word "incurred" is not defined in section 41.0105, there is
substantial case law defining "incurred" with respect to medical expenses.
For instance, the Texas Supreme Court has held that a patient incurs hos39
pital charges even though Medicare actually pays the amount due.
40 the TexarLikewise, in Texarkana Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Murdock,
33. BFI Waste Sys. of North Am., Inc. v. North Alamo Water Supply Corp., 251
S.W.3d 30, 30 (Tex. 2007).
34. 229 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2007, no pet. h.).
35. See, e.g., Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996) (plurality opinions are not binding precedent); Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York,
871 S.W.2d 175, 176-77 (Tex. 1994); City of Fort Worth v. Crockett, 142 S.W.3d 550, 554
n.23 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); D.M. Diamond Corp. v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 655,659 n.6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Conner v. Conticarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1997, no writ) Toubaniaris v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 916 S.W.2d 21, 24 n.3 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995 pet. denied) (plurality opinions are merely dicta).
36. See Toubaniaris, 916 S.W.2d at 24 n.3.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 769.
39. Black v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 478 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1972).
40. 903 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 946 S.W.2d
836 (Tex. 1997)
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kana Court of Appeals reviewed a $500,000 jury award for medical expenses where Medicaid paid only $352,784 and the hospital was
statutorily barred from seeking the difference from the patient. Regardless, the court of appeals ruled that the plaintiff "would be liable for all
necessary medical expenses incurred by her child."' 41 Additionally, the
Austin Court of Appeals has twice denied the admissibility of reduced
Medicare and Medicaid payments under the collateral source rule. 42
Second, the plurality opinion mistakenly restricted the collateral source
rule to only prevent a wrongdoer from benefiting from insurance independently procured by an injured party to which the wrongdoer was not
privy.43 To the contrary, the collateral source rule is not merely limited to
claims involving private insurance procured by the victim. Instead the
collateral source rule also applies in other contexts including free medical
services given to a plaintiff,44 fringe benefits received by the plaintiff related to the claim, 45 voluntary payment of wages by an employer, 46 veterans' income and care benefits, 47 Veterans' Administration disability
benefits, 4 8 medical insurance purchased by the plaintiff, 49 reductions in
medical expenses actually paid by Medicaid, 50 benefits paid by the Medicaid program, 51 and payments and reductions from Medicare.5 2
Finally, the plurality opinion mistakenly concludes that the legislature
intended to abrogate the collateral source rule.53 A simple review of the
legislative history of section 41.0105 demonstrates that the legislature
considered amending the collateral source rule, yet ultimately decided
against any modifications to the collateral source rule.5 4 However, the
plurality opinion concludes that the language of section 41.0105 is so clear
41. Id. at 874.
42. See Wong v. Graham, No. 03-00-00440-CV, 2001 WL 123932, *11 (Tex. App.-

Austin Feb. 15, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Martinez v. Vela, No. 03-9800707-CV, 2000 WL 12968, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 6, 2000, no pet.) (not designated
for publication).
43. Id. at 769 n.3.
44. See Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1980).
45. See McLemore v. Broussard, 670 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1983, no writ).

46. See Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Johansen, 179 S.W. 853, 853-54 (Tex.
1915).
47. See Montandon v. Colehour, 469 S.W.2d 222, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1971, no writ).
48. See Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 376 S.W.2d 591, 593-94 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. See Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ).
50. See Texarkana Mem'l Hosp. Inc. v. Murdock, 903 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 946 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1997).
51. See Martinez v. Vela, No. 03-98-00707-CV, 2000 WL 12968, at *3 (Tex. App.Austin Jan. 6, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
52. See Wong v. Graham, No. 03-00-00440-CV, 2001 WL 123932, at *11 (Tex. App.Austin Feb. 15, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
53. Mills, 229 S.W.3d at 769 n.3 (Stone, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 771 (citing Kirk L. Pittard, Dead or Alive; The CollateralSource Rule After
HB4, THE ADVOC., Winter 2006, at 76, 76-77 (outlining the five versions of the statute that
were considered before section 41.0105 was enacted)).
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and unambiguous that an analysis of its meaning does not require a review of the legislative history. 55 In so concluding, the plurality opinion
decides that section 41.0105 limits the plaintiff from recovering amounts
of medical expenses that have been written off by the health care provider, even though current Texas case law considers write-offs by health
care providers a collateral source, which should not be used to reduce the
plaintiff's recovery of medical expenses.5 6 It is difficult to imagine how
the significant legislative history of an ambiguous statute can summarily
be dismissed as irrelevant. Moreover, the plurality opinion disregards
standard rules of statutory construction, particularly those that presume
that the legislature enacts legislation "with complete knowledge of the
analysis should
existing law and with reference to it," and that statutory
57
include consideration of applicable common law.
All of this seems even more incredible when one considers that at the
very time this opinion was issued, the Texas Legislature was in session
and repealed Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 41.0105.
While subsequent legislative action certainly does not reflect prior legislative intent, it certainly seems to be a good indicator of what the legislature is currently considering. The Texas House of Representatives voted
unanimously to repeal section 41.0105, and all but two senators agreed.
LegislaHowever, Governor Perry vetoed the legislation after the Texas
58
veto.
his
override
longer
no
could
and
session
of
out
ture was
The proper analysis of the meaning of section 41.0105 is more adequately set forth in Justice Stone's dissenting opinion. Justice Stone notes
that "[t]he language of [section 41.0105] is not a model of clarity, perhaps
'59
because it underwent numerous revisions before it was finalized." Justice Stone further explained that regardless of whether section 41.0105 is
ambiguous, the supreme court could consider various factors to discern
the meaning of the statute. 60 Justice Stone further recognized that the
Texas Code Construction Act teaches that when the legislature enacts a
statute "it is presumed that the entire statute is meant to be effective; a
is
just and reasonable result is intended; feasible execution of the statute 61
contemplated; and public interest is favored over an private interest.
As Justice Stone concluded, the plurality opinion's interpretation of sec55. Id. at 769 n.3.
56. See, e.g., Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934 (analyzing free medical services given to the
plaintiff in the context of the collateral source rule); Oil Country Haulers, Inc. v. Griffin,
668 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (same); Texarkana
Mem'l Hosp., 903 S.W.2d at 873 (Medicaid); Martinez, 2000 WL 12968 at *3 (discussing
Medicaid in the context of the collateral source rule); Wong, 2001 WL 123932 at *11 (addressing Medicare in the context of the collateral source rule).
57. Helena Chem. Co. & Hyperformer Seed Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex.
2001); Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990).
58. Veto Statement of Gov. Perry to the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the 80th Texas Legislature, Regular Session (June 15, 2007) (on file with
author).
59. Mills, 229 S.W.3d at 771.
60. Id. at 771.
61. Id. (citing TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021 (Vernon 2005)).
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tion 41.0105 failed to comply with any of these presumed statutorily in62
tended outcomes.
Furthermore, Justice Stone found that the plurality's opinion failed to
give meaning to the term "incurred" as that term has been interpreted in
Texas case law for many years. 63 Justice Stone referred to Black's Law
Dictionary, which demonstrates that one incurs liability when one suffers
or brings on oneself a liability or expense. 64 Furthermore, Justice Stone
cited longstanding and uncontroverted case law that holds that medical
charges are incurred at the time the services are rendered to the patient. 65
Noting that there are situations in which medical expenses are not paid,
but are nevertheless incurred, Justice Stone acknowledged that there are
certain situations in which the terms "paid" and "incurred" must take on
66
different meanings.
Justice Stone further rejected the plurality's conclusion because it
failed to "produce a just or reasonable result."' 67 According to Justice
Stone, under the plurality's opinion, a "wrongdoer is rewarded by the injured party's foresight [in obtaining] medical insurance, [and] in many
instances it will likely be the wrongdoer's liability insurance carrier that
actually benefits from the injured party's foresight. ' 68 As Justice Stone
pointed out, "insult is added to injury when the injured party pays premiums for medial insurance coverage and then watches the benefits of that
coverage lower the accountability of the tortfeasor for her negligent

conduct. "69
Justice Stone further noted that health care providers often take
months to generate medical bills, to be followed by health insurance carriers who take the several additional months to review, process, and pay
the bills. 70 Therefore, at what point is a court to determine when the bills
have been incurred? 7 1 Justice Stone asked "what happens when there is a
dispute regarding the amounts due or the extent of coverage?" 72 Furthermore, "what if adjustments are made after litigation is initiated or
concluded?" 73 Justice Stone noted that section 41.0105 does not provide
answers to such questions, and concluded that the reason the statute is
silent on these issues is because the statute was "not intended to spawn
these issues."'74 Justice Stone finally concluded that "[t]here is simply no
indication that the collateral source rule was eliminated by section
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 782 (8th ed. 2004).
65. Id. (citing Black v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 478 S.W.2d at 434 (Tex. 1972)).

66. Id.
67. Id. at 771-72.
68. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).

69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id.
74. Id.
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41.0105, thus there is no need for these questions to arise." 75
In a thoughtful analysis regarding the public and private interests associated with section 41.0105, Justice Stone noted that the public interests
demonstrate that "(1) citizens should be responsible and purchase medical insurance to the extent they are financially able to do so; (2) responsible citizens should reap the full benefit of insurance coverage they have
purchased; (3) tortfeasors should be held accountable for their actions;
and (4) tortfeasors should not be fortuitous beneficiaries of an injured
party's foresight to purchase medical insurance. '7 6 Justice Stone further
noted that the private interest appears to be "that of liability insurance
77
carriers seeking to minimize their expenses in resolving liability claims."
However, Justice Stone concluded that there was "nothing in the statute
indicating the [liegislature sought to elevate the private interests above
public interests. ' 78 In fact, the language of the statute itself suggests the
contrary. The legislature rejected the earlier draft versions of section
41.0105 that eliminated the collateral source rule, thus signaling its belief
in the public benefit of maintaining the collateral source rule.
Gore v. Faye79 dealt with the procedural issue of when evidence relating to the limitation of section 41.0105, the paid or incurred statute,
should be presented: either (a) pre-verdict to the jury for its consideration, or (b) post-verdict to the court alone for its sole consideration prejudgment.80 Thus, the Amarillo Court of Appeals narrowly addressed,
"whether the trial court was required to implement section 41.0105
81
through presentation of evidence to the jury."
Faye sued Gore for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision. 82 At trial, Faye introduced evidence through statutory affidavits 8of3
the amounts charged for treatment by four of her healthcare providers.
The itemized statements attached to the affidavits were redacted, reflecting only the initial charges and not the amounts paid, adjusted, or discounted. 84 During trial, the court denied Gore's request to submit
evidence to the jury of the payments and discounts applied to the medical
bills.85 The trial court ruled that this was a "post-verdict pre-judgment
to the court only for
matter" and permitted Gore to submit the evidence
86
consideration post-verdict and pre-judgment.
Gore appealed arguing that section 41.0105 required the court to admit
evidence of payments and discounts applied on Faye's medical bills for
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
253 S.W. 3d 785 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, 2008, no pet.).
TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 41.0105 (Vernon 2008).
Id. at *4.
Gore, 253 S.W.3d at 786.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789.
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the jury to consider, as opposed to solely for post-verdict prejudgment
87
consideration as the trial court had ruled.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals, ruled that section 41.0105 is a postverdict matter and that evidence relating to the limitation of section
41.0105 is not proper jury evidence, reasoning that "section 41.0105 contains no procedural direction for its application at trial."88 The court further noted that, "admission of such evidence before the jury in a personal
injury case involves a significant departure from existing trial practice in

Texas." 8 9 The court held that "[w]ithout a more explicit statutory provi-

sion or guidance from our supreme court, [it saw] no abuse of discretion
in the trial court's decision to apply section 41.0105 post-verdict." 90
In Fortis Benefits v. Cantu,9 1 a landmark case that reversed nearly three
decades of settled law, the Texas Supreme Court set aside the made
whole doctrine as it applies to health insurance subrogation claims in
Texas. 92 The made whole doctrine, as enunciated in the 1980 case of Ortiz v. Great Southern Fire & Casualty InsuranceCo., states that an insurer
is not entitled to subrogation ifthe insured's loss is in excess of the
amounts recovered from the third party causing the loss or their insurer. 93
In finding that contract subrogation rights prevail over equitable subrogation rights, the supreme court effectively subjugated the rights of injured
Texans in favor of insurance companies.
The precise issue as the Texas Supreme Court framed it was "whether
the equitable 'made-whole' doctrine-the rule that an insurer is not entitled to subrogation of medical benefits unless the insured has been 'made
whole'-trumps an insurer's contract-based subrogation right."'94 The supreme court held "that the 'made-whole' doctrine must yield to Fortis's
right to contractual subrogation under the plain terms of the insurance
policy."'95 In order to reach this inequitable result, the supreme court not
only ignored decades of its own precedent and years of precedent from
other courts, but also failed to recognize a health insurance contract as an
adhesion contract promulgated by insurance conglomerates with far superior bargaining power than most insureds. Thus, the supreme court literally modified the contractual language by reading the words "first
money" into the contract to establish when and how much Fortis should
receive.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 790.
Id.

91. 234 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2007).
92. The very purpose of the made-whole doctrine is that when a liable third party has
insufficient funds to make the injured victim and the injured victim's insurer whole for the
losses suffered, the insurer should bear the loss because it contracted and received premiums for this very risk. See Ortiz v. Great So. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 342, 344
(Tex. 1980) (quoting Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Wis. 1977)).

93. Id.; Ortiz, 597 S.W.2d at 344.
94. Fortis Benefits (Fortis 1/), 234 S.W.3d at 644.

95. Id.
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Vanessa Cantu was rendered a paraplegic as the result of a car accident
on April 12, 1998.96 She subsequently sued the driver of the car in which
she was the passenger (Michael Patman), the driver's employer (Sun97
dance Resources, Inc.), the vehicle seller, and Ford Motor Company.
Fortis, Ms. Cantu's medical insurer through her father, intervened to recover the monies it paid under the medical insurance policy. 98 All parties
agreed that Fortis need not participate in pre-trial or trial proceedings but
could assert subrogation and reimbursement claims only against Ms.
Cantu after rendition of a verdict. 99
Prior to trial, Ms. Cantu settled her claims with all defendants for
$1.445 million. 100 Her medical expenses totaled $378,500, and Fortis
claimed to have paid $247,534.14 of this total.10 1 In Fortis' action against
Ms. Cantu, the parties disagreed regarding the portion of the settlement
proceeds, if any, that should be paid over to Fortis.1 0 2 Ms. Cantu moved
for summary judgment, arguing that she had not been "made whole" by
the settlement because two "life care plans" estimated her future medical
expenses to be $1.7 million and $5.3 million. 10 3 Because her past and
future medical expenses, "exceeded the amount of settlement plus what
Fortis had already paid," "the 'made-whole' doctrine precluded Fortis'
contractual claims of subrogation and reimbursement. ' 10 4 Ms. Cantu's
summary judgment evidence also consisted of her attorney's affidavit
confirming that she had incurred05$378,500 in past medical expenses and
attached the two life-care plans.'
The Waco Court of Appeals noted that Fortis objected to Ms. Cantu's
summary judgment evidence, but did not specifically object to her attorney's affidavit of past medical expenses or to the life-care plans as hearsay. 10 6 Fortis submitted an employee affidavit proving up the $247,534.14
it paid for Ms. Cantu's medical expenses.1 0 7 This affidavit also stated that
unless the court held that Fortis was not obligated to pay future medical
expenses, there was a "reasonableprobability" that Fortis would continue
"to be obligated to process" Cantu's future medical benefits provided numerous conditions were met including the policy remaining in force indefinitely.10 8 Fortis did not provide any specific amount of future medical
expenses, creating a fact issue as to that amount.10 9 The policy had a
96. Id. at 644. For further factual details, see also Fortis Benefits v. Cantu (Fortis I),
170 S.W.3d 755, 756 (Tex. App.-Waco, 2005), rev'd, 234 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2007).
97. Fortis H,234 S.W.3d at 644.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Fortis 1, 170 S.W.3d at 757.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 758.
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lifetime maximum benefit of $2 million, of which $247,534.14 had been
10
paid.'
After reviewing this evidence and entertaining argument of counsel,
the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ms. Cantu."' The
Waco Court of Appeals affirmed.11 2 The Waco Court of Appeals stated
that "[a]n insurer is not entitled to subrogation if the insured's loss is in
excess of the amounts recovered from the insurer and the third party
causing the loss."1 13 The appellate court relied on well-settled law that,
"[w]hile an insurance contract providing expressly for subrogation may
remove from the realm of equity the question of whether the insurer has a
right to subrogation, it cannot answer the question of when an insurer is
actually entitled to subrogation or how much it should receive."' 1 4 The
court's reasoning relied on fundamental precepts of insurance law:
[t]he principal purpose of an insurance contract is to protect the insured from loss, thereby placing the risk of loss on the insurer [because] the insurer has accepted payments from the insured to accept
this risk of loss [and] therefore, if 'either the insurer or the insured
must to some extent go unpaid, the loss should be borne by
the in115
surer for that is the risk the insured has paid it to assume.
After conducting its review, the Waco court concluded that, "[t]his basic
principle cannot be summarily overcome by a boiler-plate provision in an
insurance contract that purports to entitle the insurer to subrogation out
of the first monies received by the insured."' " 6 "To find otherwise would
be to defeat the fundamental contractual expectations of the average insured.' 1 7 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that "Fortis's contractual subrogation and reimbursement rights are subject to the made-whole
doctrine."' 18
Fortis immediately appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Justice Willet delivered the supreme court's opinion. After a brief recitation of
facts, the Texas Supreme Court explained the genesis of the made-whole
doctrine from the Ortiz case, a case concerning property loss. 119 In that
case, the supreme court stated that equity cuts both ways, such that while
equitable subrogation prevents the insured from receiving a double recovery (once from the insurer and again from the tortfeasor), it also prevents the insurer from recovering from the insured when the insured's
total recovery is less than his total loss. 1 20 Distinguishing the present case
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Ortiz 597 S.W.2d at 343).
114. Id. (citing Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co., 663 S.W.2d 627, 637
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
115. See id. (internal citations omitted).
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Oss v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 807 F.2d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1987)).
118. Id.
119. Fortis H, 234 S.W.3d at 644.
120. Id. at 645.
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from Ortiz, the supreme court then opined that "Ortiz would govern if
Fortis merely asserted a claim for equitable subrogation."'12 The supreme court found that Fortis was not citing equitable principles, but separate contractual rights of subrogation and reimbursement.12 2 Finding
that contract rights trump equitable principles, the supreme court held
that the made-whole doctrine did not displace Fortis's contractual subrogation or reimbursement provisions.' 2 3
The supreme court had to overcome several other hurdles, however, in
order to decide whether Fortis's contract rights trumped Cantu's equitable rights. First, the supreme court summarily rejected years of precedent
where courts applied the equitable principles of the made-whole doctrine
24
to contractual subrogation claims.'
Second, the supreme court had to reconcile public policy concerns by
holding that Fortis's contractual subrogation and reimbursement provisions trump equitable public policy concerns. The supreme court relied
on a distinguishable case involving a statutory worker's compensation
policy to make its otherwise unsupported global finding that, "[n]either
subrogation nor reimbursement clauses violate Texas public policy."'1 25
The supreme court also relied on mere obitur dicta in footnote 51 to infer
that Fortis's contract bears the tacit approval of the TDI because the
Texas "Insurance Code requires insurers to submit their insurance forms
to the [Texas Department of Insurance ("TDI")] for approval" and because "TDI can disapprove forms it deems unjust [but] did not do so
26
here."1'

Third, the supreme court sidestepped the issue of whether a health insurance carrier has inequitable bargaining power. The fact is that Ms.
Cantu was covered by a health insurance policy issued to her father's employer under which Ms. Cantu was covered.1 27 While the supreme court
concedes that this was likely an adhesion contract, it relied on one of its
recent opinions to hold that even "adhesion contracts are not automatically unconscionable or void."'1 28 The supreme court then stated, again in
pure obitur dicta, that it is not per se unconscionable for an insurer to
include a subrogation or reimbursement clause in an adhesion
129
contract.
Once the supreme court brushed aside all obstacles to Fortis's recovery, they had to resolve the question of when an insurer is actually entitled to subrogation and how much it should receive. In other words, was
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 645-46. (refusing to apply the holding and reasoning of Oss v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 807 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1987)), and Esparza v. Scott & White Health
Plan, 909 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied)).
125. Id. at 649 (citing Ortiz, 597 S.W.2d 342, 343).
126. Id. at n.51.
127. Fortis 1, 170 S.W.3d at 757.
128. Fortis 11, 234 S.W.3d at 650 n.53.
129. Id.
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Fortis entitled to "first money" under the terms of its contract language?
Fortis's contract did not spell-out who received money first or that the
insurer had a claim to "first money," instead stating only that Fortis was
130
subrogated to all rights of recovery that Cantu had against anyone.
The supreme court noted that "[n]owhere does this provision suggest that
Cantu must first be "made-whole" for Fortis to recover."1 31 Of course,
the converse was also true. 132 Disregarding an established rule of constitution that a contract, particularly an adhesion contract, should be construed against the drafter of the contract, the supreme court read
nonexistent language into the Fortis contract in determining that Fortis
1 33
was in fact entitled to "first money.
The supreme court's landmark holding in Fortismarks one more example of how the Texas Supreme Court has subjugated the rights of individuals to the rights of big business. While providing a favorable
environment for companies to do business in the state may be a lofty
goal, it should be buffered with safeguards and protections for those not
in a position to protect themselves.
III.

PRE-TRIAL AND DISCOVERY

In Low v. Henry,134 a prescription drug products liability case where
medical malpractice was pleaded in the alternative, the Texas Supreme
Court broadened attorney sanctions under chapter 10 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code to cover claims made in the alternative.
The plaintiff, a widow whose husband died in 1999 after taking the prescription drug Propulsid, sued the manufacturer of the drug and the individual doctors believed to have prescribed the drug to the plaintiff's
deceased husband. 13 5 The medical malpractice claims against the doctors
were brought in the alternative, while the thrust of the suit were the
claims against the drug's manufacturer. The medical records obtained by
the plaintiff's attorney prior to filing suit did not indicate whether the
accused doctors had actually prescribed the drug to the plaintiff. Citing a
lack of evidence establishing that the doctors had prescribed the drug to
the decedent, the doctors filed motions for sanctions against the plaintiff
widow and her attorney under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and
chapters 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The
plaintiff's attorney subsequently withdrew from representing the plaintiff,
but the trial court permitted the doctors to move forward on their motions for sanctions against the attorney. The attorney contested the sanctions on the basis that the medical malpractice claims were made in the
alternative to the claims against the manufacturer. The trial court sided
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
221 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2007).
Id. at 613
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with the doctors and imposed $50,000 in sanctions against the attorney
citing only chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 136
The attorney appealed.
The supreme court considered the application of chapter 10 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to alternative pleadings. As permitted under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 48, pleading in the alternative allows multiple allegations, which may even conflict, to be alleged
against a defendant, but there still must be a reasonable basis for each
alternative allegation.' 3 7 By signing the pleading, the signer certifies that
each claim, each allegation, and each denial is based on the signatory's
"best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry. '' 138 The statute dictates that each claim and each allegation be individually evaluated for support. Similarly, the fact that an allegation or
claim is alleged against several defendants-so-called "group pleadings"-does not relieve the party from meeting the express requirements
of chapter 10. Each claim against each defendant must satisfy chapter 10
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
The supreme court determined that sanctions were merited, but remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the amount of the penalty
as there was no evidence that sanctions imposed were based on expenses,
court costs, or attorney's fees as required by the statue.
In In re Graco Children's Products,Inc.,139 a products liability case, the

plaintiffs were not allowed to seek discovery of a defendant manufacturer's testing or state of mind in relation to its other products. Plaintiffs'
five-week-old son died during an automobile rollover accident near McComb, Mississippi, allegedly due to a faulty harness clip on the infant's
car seat which failed to restrain him, proximately causing the death. 140
Graco was the manufacturer of the car seat.
Two weeks before trial, Graco entered into a provisional settlement
with the Consumer Products Safety Commission, agreeing to pay a "$4
million dollar penalty-the largest penalty ever imposed by the agencyfor failing to report defects in more than a dozen products, including high
chairs, swings, strollers, toddler beds and infant carriers." 1 41 But the sole
defect cited in Graco's car seats was the carrying handle used only when
walking, not driving. Following the settlement between Graco and the
Consumer Products Safety Commission, the plaintiff's attorney immediately served a notice of deposition and a request for production on
Graco, seeking twenty categories of documents relating to the products
recalled for product defects, complaints received by Graco, or any person
involved with the products or the investigation. Graco objected on the
basis that the recall was unrelated to the car seat or defects described in
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 48
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

210 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2006)
Id. at 601.
Id. at 600.

§ 10.001

(Vernon 2002).
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plaintiff's suit, and would require Graco to produce approximately 20,000
pages of documents located in three states. 142 The trial court ordered
Graco to produce two representatives for deposition as well as all the
documents that the plaintiff requested. Later, when the appellate court
denied relief, Graco filed a writ of mandamus to the Texas Supreme
Court.
Though the supreme court acknowledged the general rule that "the
scope of discovery is within the trial court's discretion,"' 1 43 the supreme
court sided with the manufacturer in ruling that the plaintiff's request for
discovery was overly broad. 144 On the basis of relevance, the supreme
court ruled that the plaintiff could not seek additional discovery on the
defendant's alleged failure to conduct rollover testing of other similar
products, such as high chairs and strollers. 145 Thus, the manufacturer's
state of mind about the efficacy of the car seat did not permit further
discovery into the manufacturer's state of mind as to the safety of their
other products. In sum, the plaintiff was denied the right to make any
inquiry about any of the other products manufactured by Graco to establish Graco's negligence in the instant case.
In In re Allied Chemical Corporation,'46a mass tort case, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that six months is insufficient to provide the defense
with a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the first plaintiff's trial,
147
where the plaintiff's experts had not yet been designated.
Approximately 1,900 plaintiffs in Hidalgo County brought a mass tort
suit against thirty defendants, for exposure to a "toxic soup" of chemical
fumes and leaks from several sites where pesticides were mixed or
stored.' 48 Through discovery, the plaintiffs provided the defendants a
"long list of chemicals to which they were potentially exposed, and medical articles and expert reports suggesting some of those chemicals were
capable of causing or significantly contributing to some of their diseases.
But the plaintiffs did not designate an expert to establish a nexus between
their injuries and the defendant's products.
Five years after the case was filed, the trial court consolidated five of
the claims and set a trial date. The parties were given a little more than
six months to prepare for trial. 1 49 The defendants sought writ of mandamus to preclude trial on the basis that the plaintiffs had not yet identified
a causation expert. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals declined to intervene in what was essentially a discovery or docketing dispute. The defendants then filed a writ of mandamus to the Texas Supreme Court.
142. Id.

143. Id. at 600.
144. Id. at 601.

145. Id.
146. 227 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2007).

147. Id. at 659.
148. Id. at 654.

149. Id.
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In the opinion of the supreme court, setting a trial before the plaintiff's
designate their expert could result in a "monumental waste of judicial
resources." 150 The supreme court went on to emphasize that in a mass
toxic tort action, a claimant must do more than identify the products and
provide medical articles and expert reports. 15 1 The claimant must also
designate a medical expert who can connect the plaintiffs' diseases to the
defendants' products. 152 Once an expert was designated, the defendants
must be given a "reasonable opportunity" to prepare for trial. The supreme court did not define "reasonable opportunity." But in the mass
tort context at least, six months from identification of plaintiff's experts
was not, in the supreme court's opinion, enough time to permit the defendants to form their defense. Siding with the defendants, the supreme
court granted a conditional mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order setting any of the plaintiffs' claims for trial. 153
In In re Allstate County Mutual Insurance Co.,1 54 the Texas Supreme
Court intervened on behalf of an insurance company to limit scope of
discovery into an insurance company's claims practices. Following a car
accident, two plaintiffs filed suit against the at-fault driver and her insurance carrier, Allstate County Mutual Insurance Company, and Allstate's
adjuster Gonzalez. 155 As part of their discovery, the plaintiffs sent the
insurer and its adjuster 65 requests for admission, 59 interrogatories, and
89 requests for production. The various discovery requests included requests for transcripts of all testimony given by any Allstate agent on the
topic of insurance, every court order where a court found Allstate made a
wrongful assessment in the value of a damaged vehicle, personnel files of
every Allstate employee that had, according to a Texas court, wrongfully
assessed the value of a damaged vehicle, and all documents relating to
Allstate's status as a corporation as well as its net worth. Allstate and
Gonzalez objected to the plaintiffs' requests as irrelevant (and thus necessarily overbroad), then filed a writ of mandamus. 156
Based on the scope of plaintiff's claims relating to a specific auto accident and the amount in controversy, the supreme court sided with the
insurance company and directed the trial court to vacate its discovery
order with instructions that any discovery, if allowed, must be reasonable
and narrowly tailored to the specific accident or claim. 157 Further, the
supreme court found that any discovery requests into reasons why Allstate might have reneged on settlement offers in the past, would be irrelevant in proving motive or intent under Texas Rule of Evidence 404; Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3; and Texas Rule of Evidence 401.158 Thus,
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 658.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 659.

227 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. 2007).
Id. at 668.

Id.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 669-70.
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plaintiffs were specifically prohibited from seeking discovery on virtually
any issue relating to the insurer's claims process.
IV.

CAUSATION

In Jackson v. Axelrad,159 the Texas Supreme Court held that in the
medical malpractice context a doctor, because of his medical training,
may be deemed to have proportionate responsibility for his injuries. 160 In
an unusual medical malpractice case, a psychiatrist sued his internist for
failure to diagnose diverticulitis. Following months of suffering from intermittent abdominal cramps and diarrhea, the plaintiff experienced an
abrupt episode of acute pain prompting him to seek treatment. 61 The
defendant internist, who was also a doctor, made a diagnosis of fecal impaction and prescribed a laxative and an enema to relieve the symptoms.
As it turned out, the defendant was wrong. The plaintiff was actually
suffering from diverticulitis. In such circumstances, an enema is not an
appropriate treatment because of the risk of perforating the colon.
At home, the plaintiff complied with his doctor's orders. Immediately
following treatment, the plaintiff experienced chills, nausea, rigors, and
severe abdominal pain. 162 His wife rushed him to the emergency room.
The defendant internist did not come to the emergency room, and the
plaintiff was seen by another doctor. The new doctor operated on the
plaintiff for a suspected appendicitis. Following surgery, the plaintiff
learned that he had actually been suffering from diverticulitis and a perforated colon. 163 Treatment included removal of a section of the plaintiff's colon, construction of a temporary colostomy, followed by surgery
to reconnect the colon. A severe drug reaction further complicated the
plaintiff's recovery.
At trial, the plaintiff and defendant each claimed the other was negligent. The jury agreed with them both, but attributed slightly more fault
to the plaintiff, finding him fifty-one percent responsible and the defendant only forty-nine percent responsible. Therefore, the trial court entered a take nothing judgment in favor of the defendant. 164 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, disregarding any
negligence finding against the plaintiff on the basis that laymen are generally under no duty to volunteer information to their doctor during medical treatment.1 65 The defendant internist filed an appeal to the Texas
Supreme Court.
159. 221 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2007).
160. Id. at 652.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 2008) ("In an action to
which this chapter applies, a claimant may not recover damages if his percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent.").
165. Id.
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The Texas Supreme Court, siding with the defendant internist, granted
the defendant's petition on the basis that the court of appeals disregarded
evidence that the plaintiff did not report when his abdominal pain began. 166 In rendering its opinion, the supreme court concluded that jurors
could consider the plaintiff's expertise and training as a physician. 167 In
cases involving medical negligence, the patient carries the burden of
proof of establishing that the physician defendant has "undertaken a
mode or form of treatment which a reasonable and prudent member of
the medical profession would not have undertaken under the same or
similar circumstances.' '168 The factors to be considered include: the physician defendant's expertise and the means available to him or her, the
patient's health, and the current state of medical knowledge. 169 Therefore in a medical malpractice case, a plaintiff physician, even a physician
in an unrelated field such as psychiatry, is held to a higher standard than a
layperson and can be assessed proportionate responsibility by the finder
of fact.
More broadly, the supreme court went on to suggest that any patient's
statement to a doctor concerning his or her health may play a critical role
in the responsibility of the treating physician. 17 0 The accepted standard
prior to this case had been that a patient has a duty to cooperate in diagnosis in only two instances: (1) responding truthfully to questions posed
by a physician and (2) volunteering information that is both significant
and unknown to the physician. However, the supreme court disagreed
that a patient's duties were confined to only these categories. 171 Instead,
the supreme court set out a broader fact-based standard: "[t]he specificity
of a doctor's questions and a patient's responses will necessarily depend
on many factors-the language skills of each, their specialized knowledge, the length of their relationship, the urgency of the situation, the
frequency of previous examinations, the patient's current condition, and
so on." 172 Thus, the supreme court suggests that the content and timing
of a patient's statements to his or her doctor will play a vital role in determining the doctor's culpability in a medical negligence case.
In Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 173 another wrongful death case decided
in favor of the defendant, the Texas Supreme Court further restricted the
admissibility of expert testimony by ruling that a causation expert must
provide reliable methodology to support his or her opinions. 74 The
driver of petroleum tanker was killed when his truck overturned. 175 Following the accident, a fire erupted causing the tractor, the trailer, and its
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Jackson, 221 S.W.3d at 652.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id. at 655.
206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex 2006).
Id. at 581.
Id. at 575.
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cargo to all burn in the fire. The driver escaped, but was badly burned
and subsequently died from his injuries. The driver's survivors filed suit
against the tractor's manufacturer, Mack Trucks, Inc. ("Mack"), asserting
claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and misrepresentation. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Mack failed to
warn the driver that the tractor had design and manufacturing defects
including: (1) a fuel system unreasonably prone to releasing fuel during
an accident, and (2) ignition sources, such as hot manifolds and electric
batteries, which were located in areas conducive to the ignition of redefects and causaleased fuel. Plaintiffs designated an expert on design
176
tion to testify about post-collision, fuel-fed fires.
A Robinson177 hearing was held on Mack's motion to exclude the expert's testimony. At that hearing the expert opined that the tractor's battery was the source for igniting the tractor's diesel fuel because it was
located too close to the tractor's fuel tanks. The tractor's own fuel in turn
ignited the crude oil being transported in the attached trailer. The expert
labeled it a "fire triangle. ' 178 The expert did not testify how the rollover
occurred or how different parts of the vehicle would have been affected
or harmed during the rollover. In addition, he did not testify that he had
inspected the remains of the burned tractor and trailer, or performed or
reviewed any reconstruction analysis.
Defendants moved to exclude the plaintiff's expert testimony and for
summary judgment on the basis of an absence of evidentiary proof as to
causation. In response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed the expert's deposition and his expert report with the court.
They also later submitted the expert's testimony through a bill of exceptions. 179 Nevertheless, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Mack. The court of appeals reversed, based on the evidence included
in the bill of exceptions. 180 The Texas Supreme Court disagreed.
The supreme court concluded that the expert testimony set out mere
"factors" and "facts" that were consistent with his opinions; specifically,
that the fire began when the tractor's battery ignited the diesel fuel in its
own tanks. The reliability inquiry as to the admissibility of the expert's
testimony asks whether the methodology and analysis used by the expert
to reach his conclusions are reliable, not whether his conclusions appear
to be valid. 181 Applied in this case, the expert would be required to present some evidence as to the methodology that reliably supported his
opinions that the "ignition" and "fuel" parts of the fire triangle were supplied, respectively, by the tractor's battery system and fuel system, in order for the supreme court to accept the expert's testimony on causation
as reliable. The fact that fuel system design could have lead to the sepa176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 576, 580.
See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); TEX. R. App. P. 33 (comment to 1997 change).
Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 576.
Id. at 581; see also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. 2004).
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ration of the hoses during the accident was, standing alone, not sufficient
evidence that the hoses did separate. The plaintiff's needed to provide
more than mere evidence of a fuel leak to survive summary judgment on
their theory that the fire was caused by a defect in the design and manufacture of tractor's fuel system. 182
The supreme court zeroed in on the fact that the expert had not inspected the actual ignition system and fuel system of the burned tractor
and trailer, or performed or reviewed a reconstruction analysis and, thus,
could not testify as to having direct personal knowledge of the alleged
defects of this specific vehicle. 183 Because of this weakness, the supreme
court reversed and held that the plaintiff take nothing. The supreme
court further admonished the court of appeals for having considered as
evidence the testimony submitted through the bill of exceptions. 184
In sum, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the causation testimony of
plaintiff's expert was inadmissible. 185 Having dismissed the expert's opinion on causation, the plaintiffs were without any other evidence on causation, since only an expert could provide testimony on causation in this
type of case. 186 The supreme court ordered a take-nothing judgment be
entered in favor of the defendants.
In a tragic auto case, Guevara v. Ferrer,18 7 the Texas Supreme Court
revised its long-standing position in Morgan,a88 in ruling that testimony
from laypersons, even if supported by medical records, is legally insufficient to establish causation in a wrongful death case. 189
An elderly man, Arturo Labao, was a passenger in his son-in-law's car
when another motorist turned in front of them causing an accident.' 90
Mr. Labao was injured during the accident and died approximately six
months later. His daughter and son-in-law filed suit against the other
driver for wrongful death. At trial, the plaintiffs testified about the extent of Mr. Labao's injuries and the medical treatment he received following the accident. The plaintiffs also introduced into evidence medical
bills demonstrating total medical expenses of more than $1 million. A
limited portion of the medical records were introduced into the record at
182. Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 582; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d

598, 600-01 (Tex. 2004); Gen'l Motors Corp. v. Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. 2005);
Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2004).

183. Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 580.
184. The supreme court's admonishment of the court of appeals about reviewing evidence set out in a bill of exceptions leaves one to wonder how a practitioner would preserve excluded evidence at the time of trial. If the plaintiffs' counsel had not made a bill of
exceptions to offer the expert's testimony, the case may well have never been reviewed at
all.
185. See Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 580.
186. See Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., 146 S.W.3d 113, 119-20 (Tex. 2004) (holding
that expert testimony is required when an issue involves matters beyond jurors' common
understanding).
187. 247 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. 2007).
188. See Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 663.
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trial, but no medical testimony was given. The medical records referred
to the accident, treatment received as a result of the accident, and other
medical conditions such as hypertension, heart disease, and joint disease.
The jury awarded Arturo's family over $1.1 million for Arturo's medi191
Although
cal expenses and $125,000 for his pain and mental anguish.
were
received
Arturo
treatments
the
that
argue
not
did
defendant
the
moved
defendant
the
unreasonable,
were
charges
the
that
or
unnecessary
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that there was no
evidence of a causal link between the conditions treated and the accident.
The plaintiffs argued that lay testimony of Arturo having no such conditions prior to the accident, facts about the accident itself, and the sequence of treatments following the accident were sufficient to establish a
causal relationship. Regardless, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered a takenothing judgment.
192
In
The plaintiffs appealed citing Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp.
layperson's
from
testimony
that
held
Morgan the Texas Supreme Court
alone was legally sufficient evidence to establish causation. The court of
appeals had agreed that the Morgan standard applied and concluded that
the testimony at trial "established a sequence of events which provided a
strong, logically traceable connection between the event and the condition" so that a layperson could "determine, with reasonable probability,
there was some evidence of the causal relationship between the event and
the condition."'1 93 The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the
trial court ordering it to enter a judgment based on the jury's verdict. The
defendant appealed, asking the supreme court to reconsider its ruling in
Morgan. It did.
Morgan has been the law for more than twenty years. In Morgan, the
supreme court stated that expert medical evidence was not needed to establish that chemical fumes from a typesetting machine caused Morgan's
medical symptoms. 194 Testimony of lay witnesses on causation was sufficient. The supreme court stated that "lay testimony establishing a sequence of events which provides a strong, logically traceable connection
between the event and the condition is [generally] sufficient proof of causation."1 95 The supreme court retreated from its ruling in Morgan by disstating that it "merely applied
tinguishing the case as being fact specific,
'196
the rule to a particular set of facts."
The trial evidence presented in personal injury cases, generally includes
evidence as to the injured person's condition prior to the accident, the
circumstances surrounding the accident, evidence as to the injured person's condition after the accident, and evidence as to the injured person's
191. Id. at 665.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984)
Guevara, 247 S.W. 3d at 665.
Id. at 666, see Morgan, 675 S.W.2d 733.
Guevara, 247 S.W.3d at 666.
Id.
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progress through the prescribed course of treatment following the accident. 197 This type of evidence "establishing a sequence of events which
provides a strong, logically traceable connection between the event and
the condition" is sufficient to support a finding of causation between an
accident and basic physical conditions that are: "(1) within the common
knowledge and experience of laypersons, (2) did not exist before the accident, (3) appeared after and close in time to the accident, and (4) are
within the common knowledge and experience of laypersons, caused by
1 98
automobile accidents.
In Arturo's case, the medical billing records included, among other expenses, the cost of (1) multiple abdominal surgeries; (2) three separate
stays in health care facilities, one being more than three months in duration; (3) a wide variety of pharmaceutical supplies and drugs; (4) numerous laboratory procedures; (5) treatments for respiratory failure; (6)
varied forms of physical therapy; (7) treatments for kidney failure; and
(8) assorted miscellaneous medical charges. Such treatments suggest
complex medical conditions that require expert testimony as to causation. 199 Instead, if Arturo had suffered injuries such as broken bones,
cuts, and bruises, and the lay witnesses provided undisputed evidence
that he did not have such injuries prior to the accident, then the conditions and causal link between the accident and his physical condition
would ordinarily be within the common knowledge and general experi200
ence of laypersons.
Because Arturo's treatments occurred over an extended period of
months and was not confined to the traditional types of injuries treated
immediately after an accident, such as broken bones or lacerations, the
supreme court concluded that mere lay testimony coupled with the
records was not legally sufficient to prove that all of the treatments resulted from the accident. 20 ' Rather, expert testimony would be required.
However, the supreme court did acknowledge that lay testimony is alone
sufficient to support a finding of causation in the limited circumstances
where both the occurrence in question and injuries complained of are of
the nature laypersons can evaluate based upon their common knowledge
202
and general experience.
The supreme court remanded the case to the El Paso Court of Appeals
to consider remittitur as to expenses for which expert evidence is required, and if the amounts could not be determined, then the case was to
be remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

197. Id. at 666-67.

198. Id. at 669.

199. See Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 119 (Tex.1996); Lenger v. Physician's Gen.

Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970).

200. Guevara, 247 S.W.3d at 667.
201. Id. at 669-70.
202. Id. at 668.
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V. IMMUNITY
In a case where an innocent bystander was injured during a police pursuit, City of San Antonio v. Ytuarte,20 3 the Texas Supreme Court enhanced governmental-immunity protection by requiring that courts
evaluate not only the risk to the public of engaging in pursuit, but also the
need to apprehend the suspect.20 4 Delores Ytuarte sued the City of San
Antonio ("San Antonio") for personal injuries that resulted from a police
pursuit of an armed robbery suspect. 20 5 The pursuit began after police
spotted an aggravated robbery suspect driving a stolen suburban. 20 6 The
pursuit continued for twenty minutes until officers received a command
from their sergeant to back off in an apparent effort to trick the suspect
into thinking the chase was over.20 7 Some time after this order, the susinto a parked car and injured the plaintiff, Delores
pect crashed
20 8
Ytuarte.
The trial court denied San Antonio's motion for summary judgment
premised on governmental immunity. 20 9 On interlocutory appeal, the
San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed and San Antonio filed a petition
for review with the supreme court.2 10 Holding that the decision of the
with a prior decision of the supreme court, the
court of appeals conflicted
211
court granted review.
In general, a police officer who performs his duties in good faith is
immune from civil suit. 212 In order to determine whether a particular
police officer acted in good faith the supreme court considers the officer's
conduct against the balance of two factors.213 "[A]n officer acts in good
faith if a reasonably prudent officer under the same or similar circumstances could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the
suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing
(rather than terminating) the pursuit. ' 2 14 If the defendant police officer
puts forward evidence of good faith in light of these factors, the plaintiff
must do more to controvert this proof than present evidence that a reasonably prudent officer could have decided to end the pursuit. 215 Indeed,
the plaintiff must show that "no reasonable officer in the defendant's position could have thought that the situation justified the officer's actions. ''2 16 Thus, in effect, the plaintiff must establish, conclusively, that
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

229 S.W.3d 318, 319-20 (Tex. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 319-20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2 17
the officer acted unreasonably.
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court noted that the
court of appeals did not analyze the evidence against the Wadewitz fac-

tors at all. 2 18 Instead of looking at the need to apprehend the suspect and

the risk to the public of doing so in a pursuit, the court of appeals focused
on whether the officers were still in pursuit of the suspect when he
crashed into Ytuarte. 219 In doing so, the court of appeals unnecessarily
evaluated a fact issue that was irrelevant to the application of governmental immunity. The supreme court believed this constituted error.2 20
The supreme court engaged in its own analysis of whether there was a
factual dispute with respect to the Wadewitz factors. 22 1 The supreme
court noted that the officers' deposition testimony sufficiently addressed
both the need to apprehend the suspect and the risk to the public in doing
so. 222 The supreme court went on to address both parties' expert testimony in light of the requirement that "expert testimony on good faith
must address what a reasonabl[y] prudent officer could have believed
under the circumstances as well as the need and risk factors. '223 San
Antonio's expert testified in deposition about both the need to apprehend the suspect and the risk of pursuing the suspect and concluded that
the officers acted in good faith.2 24 On the other hand, Ytuarte's expert
testified about the risk involved but not the need to apprehend the suspect.225 Thus, the supreme court held that Ytuarte's evidence was insuffi-

cient to controvert San Antonio's proof of good faith. 226 Accordingly,
the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and dismissed the plain227
tiff's case.

In City of Dallas v. Thompson,228 a sovereign immunity case, the Texas
Supreme Court posited that the "possibility that a dangerous condition
can develop over time" is not knowledge that the condition is dangerous.
Margaret Thompson sued the City of Dallas ("Dallas") when she was
injured at Love Field Airport. 229 Thompson was walking through a lobby
area when she tripped on a coverplate that protruded from the floor. 230
Dallas knew the coverplate could become loose over time and when it
did, they would tighten it. 231 Accident logs showed that people had

tripped over the particular coverplate at issue but no one had tripped for
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.

224. Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 210 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. 2007).
229. Id. at 602 (Tex. 2007).
230. Id. at 603.

231. Id.
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the three years previous to Thompson's accident. 232 The trial court
granted Dallas's plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity
grounds. 233 The court of appeals reversed. 234 The supreme court granted
Dallas's petition for review.
While a city is generally immune from suit unless there is evidence that
it had actually knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition, Thompson
argued that Dallas actually knew the coverplate could come loose over
time and present a danger to those walking in the lobby.2 35 The supreme
court dismissed Thompson's evidence on the theory that mere knowledge
that materials deteriorate over time does not amount to actual knowledge
that the condition is dangerous. 2 36 Even though Dallas knew specifically
that the coverplate was prone to come loose and present a danger and
had installed extra screws in other coverplates to prevent people from
tripping, the court held that this was not enough. 2 37 Instead, the supreme
court stated that knowledge of "the possibility that a dangerous condition
can develop over time" is not knowledge that the condition is dangerous. 2 38 Based on the supreme court's reasoning, Dallas had no actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition and was therefore entitled to immunity. 239 Plaintiff's case was dismissed.
VI.

VICARIOUS AND DERIVATIVE LIABILITY

In considering the application of proportional responsibility to Texas
Dram Shop Act claims, the Texas Supreme Court ruled, in F.F.P. Operating Partners,L.P. v. Duenez, 240 that responsibility must be allocated between the liquor provider and an alcohol consuming patron.
Five members of the Duenez family sued F.F.P. Operating Partners,
L.P. ("F.F.P.") under the Texas Dram Shop Act after they were injured in
a collision with a drunk driver who purchased alcoholic beverages from a
Mr. Cut Rate convenience store owned by F.F.P.2 4 1 The drunk driver,
Roberto Ruiz, after already having consumed a case and a half of beer,
stopped at Mr. Cut Rate to buy more. 242 At Mr. Cut Rate, he purchased
another twelve-pack of beer, returned to his truck, opened one of the
cans, put it between his legs, and drove away. 243 A mile and a half from
the convenience store he swerved across the center line of the highway,
causing a head-on collision with the Duenez family. 244 Everyone suffered
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.

235. Id.

236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.

240. 237 S.W.3d 680, 682 (Tex. 2007).

241. Id. at 682.
242. Id.

243. Id.
244. Id.
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injuries. 245
Ruiz was charged criminally with intoxication assault to which he
pleaded guilty resulting in a prison sentence. 246 The Duenez family filed
a civil suit against Ruiz, F.F.P., the store clerk who sold the beer to Ruiz,
and several other parties. 247 F.F.P. filed a cross-claim against Ruiz, naming him as a responsible third party and a contribution defendant.
Shortly thereafter the Duenez family nonsuited every defendant except
F.F.P. 24 8 The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of

the Duenezes, ruling that the proportionate responsibility statute (chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code) did not apply to
the case. 249 Accordingly, the trial court severed F.F.P.'s cross-claim
against Ruiz, and F.F.P. was left as the only defendant at trial. 250 The
trial court refused to submit any questions to the jury regarding Ruiz's
responsibility or the proportionate responsibility of Ruiz and F.F.P., and
the jury returned a $35 million verdict against F.F.P.251
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings,
and F.F.P. appealed. 2 52 The Texas Supreme Court issued its initial opinion on September 3, 2004, and nearly a year later granted F.F.P.'s motion
for rehearing. 253 After oral arguments, the supreme court issued a second opinion on November 3, 2006.254 The supreme court denied the

Duenez family's motion for rehearing and issued a third opinion to replace the November 3, 2006 opinion. 255
The Texas legislature enacted the Dram Shop Act to hold liquor providers liable when their intoxicated patrons injure others. 25 6 F.F.P. sought
to include Ruiz in the charge because he was liable for his own share of
the damages. 257 The supreme court ultimately supported this position,
but did so largely in response to the dissents. Two justices, O'Neill and
Jefferson, offered separate and unique dissents reasoning that even if
Ruiz's name had been submitted and found liable by a jury, F.F.P. would
have been responsible for both its share and Ruiz's share of the judgment. Thus, no harm arose from refusing to submit him. The rest of the
supreme court disagreed with them.
Justice O'Neill based her conclusion on the language of the Dram Shop
Act which states that alcohol providers are liable "for the actions of their
customers, members, or guests. '25 8 Justice O'Neill argues that even
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682-83.

249. Id. at 683.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.

256. Id.; see TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.03 (Vernon 2007).
257. 237 S.W.3d at 682.
258. Id. at 703 (O'Neill, J. dissenting); see also TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE

ANN.

§ 2.03.
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though chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies,
this language in the Dram Shop Act along with the common law principle
that imputed liability makes a defendant liable for both its share and the
share assigned to the party from which liability is imputed. 259 The rest of
the justices disagreed and held that the language of the statute does not
make F.F.P. liable for Ruiz's potential share and neither do any other
260
common law principles.
Chief Justice Jefferson dissented based on an analogy between vicarious liability in the negligent entrustment context and the Dram Shop
Act. 261 Jefferson, like O'Neill argued that F.F.P. would be liable for both
its share of the verdict and any share assigned to Ruiz because of the
common law doctrine of vicarious liability, which holds that, "a principal
' 262
[is] liable for the conduct of his employee or agent.
The supreme court, in distinguishing dram shop liability from negligent
entrustment and negligent hiring cases, held that "the [alcohol consuming] patron is not the agent or employee of the dram shop, the provider
has no control or right to control the patron, and the patron's actions
'263
causing the accident are not in furtherance of the provider's business.
Thus, under the Texas Dram Shop Act, the name of the alcohol consuming patron should be submitted along with the liquor provider to the jury
264
for proper assessment of responsibility.
The Texas Supreme Court defined the meaning of a negligent activity
claim as a claim that "arises from activity actively ongoing at the time of
the accident" in In re Texas Department of Transportation,265 a highway
fatality case. In that case, Courtney Forman died while riding in a car
that went off the road into a river where she drowned. 266 Courtney's
parents, Barbara and Steven Foreman, filed suit in Travis County Probate
Court against the Texas Department of Transportation ("TxDOT"), Gillespie County ("the County"), and others, including the driver, alleging
negligence, gross negligence, premises defect, and special defect or "in259. F.F.P., 237 S.W.3d at 682; see also TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002.003 (Vernon 2008) (directing the assignment of proportionate responsibility in tort
actions).

260. F.F.P., 237 S.W.3d at 686.

261. Id. at 697.
262. Id. at 686.
263. Id. According to the court's ruling in F.F.P., a trial court may refuse to submit the
tortfeasor in a negligent entrustment or negligent hiring case.
264. See id. at 686-94. The court also discussed the broad import of Chapter 33 and,
importantly, that any case involving multiple non-exempt responsible parties is subject to
it. Additionally, the court additionally disregarded the potential for defendants to undermine the purpose of the Dram Shop Act-to discourage liquor sales to drunk drivers.
Liquor providers may now reduce their liability by the wrongful conduct of a drunk that is
likely insolvent. Id. at 687-90. They base this disregard, in part, on the fact that "it is not
true that juries will always assign most of the responsibility ... to the [drunk] patron." Id.
at 693. While it may not always true, it seems that a jury's contempt for drunk drivers is
more than probable.
265. 218 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2007).
266. Id.
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The plaintiffs brought their claims

under the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA"). 268 The court of appeals denied mandamus relief, so TxDOT and the County sought mandamus re269
lief from the Texas Supreme Court.
The TTCA contains a mandatory venue provision that requires claims
made pursuant to the TTCA to be brought in the county in which all, or
part of, the cause of action arose.270 The Foremans argued that venue
was proper in Travis County because one of their TTCA claims arose, at
least in part, in Travis County. Specifically, they allege that "the negligent decisions and actions by TxDOT employees and agents in Travis
County resulted in the condition of the premises at the accident site in
Gillespie County [were therefore] part of a premise defect or special defect cause of action. ' 271 However, the supreme court disagreed. It highlighted its previous distinctions between causes of action based on
negligent activities and those based on premises defects. 272 "A negligent
activity claim arises from activity contemporaneous with the occurrence,
whereas a premises defect claim is based on the property itself being unsafe. '273 Thus, while the Foremans alleged that "TxDOT failed to use
ordinary care" in the design and maintenance of the bridge and roadway,
274
those activities were not actively ongoing at the time of the accident.
Put another way, the supreme court explained that "such negligent activities would be causes of the conditions at the scene of the accident," but
275
not the proximate cause.
The supreme court therefore concluded that the Foremans did not
properly plead a negligence (or gross negligence) cause of action that
would include the allegedly negligent acts or omissions that took place in
Travis County.2 76 They properly pleaded causes of action only for premises defect or special defect as to the bridge and roadway in Gillespie
County, but failed to adequately plead a cause of action against TxDOT
and the County for which Travis County would be a proper venue. 277 The
supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief directing the probate court to transfer venue of the underlying case against TxDOT and
2 78
Gillespie County, to Gillespie County.
267. Id. at 75-76.

268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. (citing TEX. CIV.
Id. at 76.

PRAC.

&

REM. CODE ANN.

§ 101.102(a) (Vernon 2005)).

272. Id. at 77 (citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006); Timberwalk
Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1998); Keetch v. Kroger Co.,

845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992)).
273. Id. (citing Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 284; Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264).
274. Id. at 78.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 78-79.
278. Id. at 79. The supreme court also rejected the Foremans' "injury by traffic control
device" and "joint enterprise" causes of action as insufficient to properly plead a negligence cause of action that arose, in part, in Travis County. Id. at 78.
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FRAUD DAMAGES

In Baylor University v. Sonnichsen,2 79 a volleyball coach sued Baylor
University ("Baylor") for breach of an oral contract and fraud for failing
to enter into a coaching contract. The Texas Supreme Court, ruling in
favor of Baylor, found that the only damages not barred by statute of
frauds in a contract dispute are out-of-pocket damages.
Tom Sonnichsen was hired to be Baylor's women's volleyball coach in
1989.280 At that time, Baylor did not issue written contracts to most of its
coaches, and did not issue one to Sonnichsen. 2 81 In May 1995, however,
Baylor administrators told their coaching staff, including Sonnichsen, that
they planned to begin providing written contracts to their coaching staff.
Specifically, Sonnichsen contended that Baylor orally agreed to enter into
a two-year contract with him. 282 Baylor in fact prepared a one-year written contract for Sonnichsen but never delivered it to him. 283 Then in December 1995, Baylor sent Sonnichsen a letter informing him that while he
would be paid for his work, he would not receive a contract for the 19961997 school year.2 84 Sonnichsen subsequently sued Baylor for (1) breach
of an oral contract to enter into a two-year written employment contract
with him for the years 1995-1997 and (2) fraud arising from Baylor's representations that it would issue him a two-year written contract. 285
The trial court granted Baylor summary judgment on both of Sonnichsen's claims based on the statute of frauds. 286 The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment as to the breach of contract claim, but held
that, as to the fraud claim, the statute of frauds barred only benefit-ofthe-bargain damages. 2 87 The court of appeals severed and remanded the
fraud claim on the basis that Sonnichsen's damages were broader than
just benefit-of-the-bargain damages. On remand, the trial court granted a
summary judgment motion filed by Baylor based on Sonnichsen's failure
to plead for damages other than benefit-of the bargain damages. 288 On
appeal, a divided court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the special exception without giving Sonnichsen another opportunity to amend his pleadings. 289 Baylor petitioned for
290
review.
The Texas Supreme Court sided with Baylor. Regarding the breach of
contract claim, the supreme court held that the trial court was not required to give Sonnichsen an opportunity to amend his pleading because
279. 221 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. 2007).
280. Id. at 633.

281. Id.
282. Id. at 634.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.

288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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the defect could not be cured by amendment. 2 9 1 The supreme court explained that Baylor's written but undelivered contract could not be a
binding contract because there was no mutual assent.2 92 Contracts require mutual assent to be enforceable, and mutual assent "generally con293
sists of signatures of the parties and delivery with the intent to bind.
Thus, because Baylor never delivered the written contract to Sonnichsen,
there was no evidence of mutual agreement.2 94 The supreme court said
this problem could not be corrected by an amended pleading, so the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the breach of contract
295
claim.
The supreme court also sided with Baylor on Sonnichsen's fraud
claim.2 96 Relying on Haase v. Glazner297 the supreme court noted that
benefit-of-the-bargain damages are barred when they are based on an unenforceable contract.2 98 Out-of-pocket damages for fraud, on the other
hand, are not barred. 299 Thus, the nature of the damages Sonnichsen
sought would govern the success of his fraud claim. 300 The supreme court
examined all of Sonnichsen's alleged damages and determined that they
were all claims for benefit-of-the-bargain damages. 30 1 The supreme court
therefore ruled that, because the damages were the same damages Sonnichsen sought to recover under an unenforceable contract, the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Baylor on the fraud
claim.30 2 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the
and rendered a take-nothing judgment against
court of appeals
303
Sonnichsen.
VIII. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes,30 4 the Texas Supreme Court
finds that on summary judgment, the appellate court must consider undis291. Id. at 635.
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)).
294. Id.
295. Id. In addition, the supreme court ruled that the new factual allegations contained
in Sonnichsen's second amended petition regarding representations made by Baylor administrators did not support a "new" breach of contract claim. The facts merely supported
his previous breach of contract claim, which was properly dismissed under the statute of
frauds. Id.
296. Id. at 637.
297. 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2001).
298. Id. at 800.
299. Id.
300. Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d at 636.
301. Id. at 636-37. Sonnichsen's alleged damages included his, "1) inability to obtain
employment during the 1996-1997 season, 2) the lost opportunity to advance his career and
increase earning capacity, 3) the lost revenues from a 1996 summer volleyball camp, and 4)
loss of tuition benefits he could have used to complete his master's degree." Id.
302. Id. at 637.
303. Id.
304. 236 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. 2007).
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puted evidence in the record. 30 5 Corte Adams worked for Goodyear at
its location in Bryan, Texas. 30 6 He was a hard worker-working long
shifts-coupled with long-distance commuting back and forth to Houston. On February 26, 1999, Adams left for Houston from Bryan in a
Goodyear vehicle. After finding the tire store (to which he was supposed
to deliver tires) closed, he stopped at his dad's house, ate dinner and consumed alcohol. He left the house at around 3:00 to purchase cigarettes at
a convenience store. The trip did not go as planned. Indeed, Adams fell
asleep at the wheel, crossed the center line into oncoming traffic, and
caused a head-on collision with a truck driven by Patrick Mayes who was
injured in the crash. 307 Mayes sued Adams and Goodyear. The trial
court granted summary judgment for Goodyear on the issue of course
30 8
and scope of employment. The court of appeals reversed.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. While it is true that an appellate
court reviewing a summary judgment must consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, the court is not free to ignore undisputed evidence that is not favorable to the non-movant. 30 9 The court of
appeals here, in determining that there was sufficient evidence to raise a
question of fact regarding whether Adams was acting within the scope of
his employment at the time of the accident, considered "only the evidence favorable to Mayes, ignoring undisputed evidence in the record
that cannot be disregarded. '3 10 This, the supreme court held, was error. 311 The supreme court found there to-be undisputed evidence that
Adams was running a personal errand in the Goodyear vehicle when the
collision occurred, and this evidence was sufficient to establish that he
312
was not acting in furtherance of his employer's business at the time.
Thus, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals,
313
and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Mayes.

305. Id. at 757.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 757.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. The supreme court also declared that Adams's receipt of workers' compensation benefits from Goodyear was not competent evidence that Adams was acting within
the scope of employment when the accident occurred, id., and that there was no evidence
that Goodyear negligently entrusted the vehicle to Adams, id.
313. Id. at 758.
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